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Abstract 
Strategic Aspects of Fighting in Alliances 
Kai A. Konrad* 
This paper surveys some of the strategic aspects that emerge if players fight in an alliance 
against an enemy. The survey includes the free-rider problem and the hold-up problem 
that emerges in the baseline model, the role of supermodularity in alliance members' 
effort contributions, the role of budget constraints, the role of information transfer inside 
the alliance, and the role of in-group favoritism. 
Keywords: Alliances, contests, conflict, in-group favoritism 
JEL classification: D72, D74
                                                 
*   Paper prepared for the workshop on The Economics of Conflict – Theory and Policy Lessons at the 
CESifo Venice Summer Institute 2011. Some part of this analysis draws partially on Chapter  9 in 
Konrad (2009). I thank Bernhard Enzi for research assistance. The usual caveat applies. But the strong man is strongest when alone.
(Friedrich Schiller, Wilhelm Tell)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Players who have a common goal often form alliances. And in many instances
there are multiple alliances that are rivals to each other, with the success of
one alliance ruling out the success of other alliances. Military alliances, po-
litical parties, R&D alliances and team competition in sports are some of the
most salient examples for this type of competition. It has been pointed out by
economists for a long time that such alliances have to bridge two potentially
important disadvantages compared to stand-alone players: a free-rider problem
a n dah o l d - u pp r o b l e m .
The free-rider problem results because alliance members, when contributing
eﬀort to the success of the alliance as a whole, make a contribution to a group-
public good. If one alliance member contributes more eﬀort to the common goal
of the alliance, this player bears the cost of this eﬀort, but the eﬀort typically
beneﬁts other members of the alliance as well. In the absence of enforceable
contracts, the contributions to this public good are made voluntarily. The prin-
ciple that governs contributions hence is simple: each member of an alliance
makes a contribution to the alliance public good such that a marginal increase
in the player’s contribution has a marginal cost for this player equal to this
player’s own beneﬁt from the increased winning probability of the alliance that
is caused by it. Olson and Zeckhauser (1966) early on highlighted this free-rider
problem in alliances. An implication of this general insight is that the members
of an alliance who contribute the lion’s share to the success of the alliance are
members who have higher than average total beneﬁts if the alliance achieves
its goals, and/or members who have a cost advantage in making contributions
to the alliance.1 Considering the expenditure of the diﬀerent members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) they found patterns that are in
line with these predictions. The military expenditure as a percentage of GNP
(in 1964) was highest for the United States, with 9.0 percentage points of GNP,
whereas Luxemburg, being the smallest member of NATO, expended a share of
only 1.7 percentage points.2 Their analysis led to a considerable amount of fur-
ther theoretical work that partially reﬁned some of the arguments and looked
at various modiﬁcations.3 They also inspired a considerable stock of further
empirical analyses on this topic.
Alliances may also suﬀer from a hold-up problem. If the alliance is victorious,
this may cause rivalry inside the alliance, depending on the goal. A defence
alliance may aim at the preservation of peace and territorial protection for
its member states, such that all member states participate in the beneﬁts of
1For a formal analysis of the model of voluntary contributions to a group public good see
the seminal work by Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) and by Esteban and Ray (2001).
2The ranking in economic size and the ranking in military expenditure as a percentage
of the GNP are not perfectly correlated, but their Table 1 (p. 267) shows the two rankings
follow each other fairly closely.
3These include, for instance, Baik, Kim, and Na (2001), Baik and Lee (1998), Davis and
Reilly (1999), Esteban and Ray (2001), Katz, Nitzan and Rosenberg (1990), Lee (1995), Nitzan
(1991a), Nitzan (1991b), Nitzan and Ueda (2008), Rapoport and Amaldoss (1997), Sandler
(1993) and Ursprung (1990).
2achieving this goal in a non-rival and non-exclusive way; in particular, they
need not struggle internally about how to distribute the peace and security
beneﬁts. This, however, is not true for all types of alliances. Alliances in an
actual military conﬂict may win something that is not a group-public good.
If an alliance defeats its rival enemy, the members of the alliance may have
to divide the spoils of victory between its members. In this case a second
strategic problem emerges inside alliances. The players who have formerly been
members of the alliance may start quarrelling about obtaining a larger share in
these spoils, and this quarrel may easily end up in a ﬁght. The Second World
War is an illustrative example. During the war a number of military powers
including the United States, the UK, France and the Soviet Union formed the
Great Alliance with the defeat of Nazi Germany and its allies as its common
objective. However, the spoils of this victory were not a pure public good.
Instead, it became clear even while Germany was not ﬁnally defeated that the
Great Alliance would split into at least two major groups that would ﬁght about
how to divide the spoils of victory between them. This ﬁght is known as the
Cold War. It took about forty years, and the arms races that took place between
the rivals dissipated an enormous amount of resources that could have been used
peacefully, instead.
Historians document that the struggle about the spoils of victory among the
players who had been members of the winning alliance is a rather common phe-
nomenon. O’Connor (1969) documents this outcome for the Napoleonic wars:
“The conﬂicting ambitions of the allies were subdued so long as the military
danger was paramount; when the enemy weakened perceptibly, the concept of
victory embraced by each member of the alliance either changed or became more
distinctive. [...] Aquarreloverthespoilsneednotawaittheendofhostilities,
and the form of victory envisioned by the participants may vary accordingly.”
(O’Connor, 1969, p. 369]. Similar outcomes are reported about the aftermath of
the First World War: “The British also disagreed with the French over economic
policy. To be sure, the two Allies cooperated on economic matters during most
of the War, and they were the principal sponsors of the Paris Economic Rev-
olutions. However, their cooperation dissolved as victory became certain and
reparation and indemnity replaced other wartime planning. Thereafter, they
became the principal competitors for shares of compensation from Germany.”
(Bunselmeyer, 1975, p. 15).4 For the Second World War: “The fact that vic-
tory was ﬁnally in sight in 1944 thus had a double and contradictory eﬀect on
the alliance. On the one hand, the removal of mortal danger made them less
inclined to subordinate individual aims to the need for hanging together and
hence a greater willingness to disregard the susceptibilities of allies. On the
other hand, the imminence of victory and the obvious desperation of the Ger-
mans suggested that this was a poor time to allow divergent views of policy and
strategy to break up a winning coalition and thereby risk all that had already
been attained at huge cost in lives and treasure.” (Weinberg, 1994, p. 736).
If former members of a victorious alliance break up and ﬁght with each
other about how to share the spoils of victory, this should reduce the value that
members of an alliance attribute to the victory of their alliance. This, in turn
creates a hold-up problem as regards their decision about how much eﬀort to
invest or contribute to increase the probability that their alliance is victorious.
4See also Kent (1989).
3The ﬁrst who formally analyzed this hold-up problem in the context of alliances
were Katz and Tokatlidu (1996) and Wärneryd (1998). Later Esteban and
Sákovics (2003) considered a two-stage contest in which players A and B are
teamed up in an alliance in a contest against player C. Should C win, C receives
the full prize and the game ends. Should the alliance win, the alliance members
have to ﬁght about who of them receives the prize, in a contest that follows
similar rules as the contest in the ﬁrst stage. They compare this game with
a symmetric, one-stage contest among the three players A, B and C, and ﬁnd
that, under rather general conditions, players A and B are better-oﬀ in the
symmetric, one-stage contest. The combined strategic disadvantages of the hold-
up problem and the free-riding problem inside the alliance make the formation
of the alliance fairly unattractive. Their result points at what could be called
an “alliance puzzle”: the formation of an alliance actually weakens the members
of the alliance, in comparison to a situation in which they act as stand-alone
players.
The insights of Esteban and Sákovics (2003) contrast with the major role
that alliances play in military conﬂict, in politics, in business and in daily life.
This suggests that there must be other aspects and considerations in the for-
mation of alliances that more than oﬀset these strategic disadvantages. This
contribution is a study of some of these oﬀsetting eﬀects, and of strategic en-
vironments in which the strategic disadvantages of alliance formation do not
play a major role. In particular, the next sections consider (1) supermodularity
in alliance members’ eﬀorts, (2) budget constraints that are suﬃciently tight
to remove the strategic problems of free-riding and the hold-up problem, (3)
the potentially beneﬁcial role of a threat of internal conﬂict as an incentive
device for overcoming the free-riding problem in making contributions to the
alliance eﬀort, (4) possible beneﬁts from information transfers among members
of an alliance, (5) the role of multiple fronts if alliance members are resource
constrained and can mutually support each other by resource transfers, and
(6) evolutionary forces that generate in-group favoritism and spiteful behavior
towards the out-group.
There are evidently many strategic aspects in the context of alliances that are
not considered here. For instance, the formation and the break-up of alliances
typically take place voluntarily and in the absence of property rights or binding
contracts. This requires alliances to be self-enforcing. The strategic considera-
tions (1)-(5) are important for explaining why the formation of an alliance can
be mutually beneﬁcial and self-enforcing. But they do not directly address the
problem of who forms an alliance with whom, or the dynamic process of forma-
tions and dissolutions and re-arrangements of alliances. Political scientists have
studied the sequential process of the formation and re-grouping of countries
in diﬀerent alliance networks over time. Economists have studied the process
of endogenous alliance formation from a theory perspective. Their analysis of
coalition formation shows that much depends on the assumptions about the
rules that apply if members of an alliance disagree or ﬁnd it advantageous to
leave a given alliance, and join another alliance, on how far-sighted they are etc.
(see, e.g., Bloch, Sánchez-Pagés and Soubeyran, 2006, and Bloch, 2011, also for
further references).
42 The baseline model
Almost all considerations (1) - (5) can be discussed as disgressions from a single
baseline model, which is essentially the framework considered by Esteban and
Sákovics (2003). This generic game in which the alliance paradox is analyzed
is as follows. There is a set of three players,  = {}. All three players
compete for a prize of a given size that is normalized to a monetary value  =1 .
Player  is a stand-alone player who chooses an eﬀort  ≥ 0 that has a cost
()=.P l a y e r s  and  are members of an alliance. They also choose
eﬀorts  ≥ 0 and  ≥ 0,a n dh a v ec o s t s()= and ()=,
respectively.5 All eﬀort choices take place independently and simultaneously.
A contest success function determines the allocation of the prize as a random
function of the eﬀort choices. In general terms, the probability for the alliance
to win is (  ), and the probability for  to win is 1− (  ),
where  is a probability and will be speciﬁed in more detail. In the baseline
framework, (  )=(+ );t h a ti s ,t h ee ﬀort choices of alliance
members simply add up to the total eﬀort of the alliance, making their eﬀorts
perfect substitutes. Should  win the prize, the game ends and the payoﬀso f
players are  =1− for player   = − for player  and  = − for
player . If the alliance wins, then the alliance members must determine how to
allocate the prize between them. Taking the behavior of victorious war alliances
as the role model, they start another ﬁght about the prize. Players  and 
expend intra-alliance eﬀorts  ≥ 0 and  ≥ 0, and a contest success function
( ) that may be of similar nature as  determines the win probability of
 under these circumstances. Accordingly, the payoﬀs of members of a winning
alliance in this subgame are 1−− for the winner and − − for the loser.
All this is common knowledge among the players.
We can solve this game by backward induction, starting with stage 2, for
diﬀerent types of contest success functions  and . Figure 1 reports the equi-
librium results for three cases.
The ﬁrst line in Figure 1 reports the case in which winning is determined
by pure luck ( =  ≡ 12). In this case the disadvantage of alliance players
is smallest, and is essentially induced by the speciﬁc choice of the exogenous
win-probabilities.
The second line in Figure 1 considers the case in which winning or losing
follows the Tullock (1980) lottery contest success function, i.e.,  =(  +
)( +  + ),w h e r e +  +   0,a n d =1 2 otherwise, and
 = ( + ) where  +   0,a n d =1 2 otherwise. In this case
the internal ﬁght between former alliance members  and  is well-known to
reduce the value that each of them attributes to winning the contest from 12
(which each would attribute to winning if they just shared the prize equally
and peacefully in this case) to 14. Accordingly, the stage-1 contest between
the alliance and player  is highly asymmetric as regards the values attributed
to winning. This also makes the equilibrium contributions and the equilibrium
payoﬀs very asymmetric.
The third line in Figure 1 considers the case in which, at both stages, the
5Esteban and Sákovics (2003) assume convex cost functions. This has the advantage of
making interior equilibrium outcomes more likely, but also introduces notation which we do
not need in what follows.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium strategies and payoﬀs for the alliance game in the baseline
model for three diﬀerent contest success functions. In case of multiple equilibria,
these values refer to the symmetric equilibrium.
party which expends the higher eﬀort wins the contest. The contest success
functions are those of an all-pay auction without noise in this case.6 Here the
hold-up problem is at a maximum: players  and  know that they will dissipate
the full value of the prize in their internal ﬁght, should their alliance win against
player .7 Hence, even if they win, they win nothing. Each of them attributes
a value of zero to the victory of the alliance, whereas player  attributes the
full value of the prize to winning against the alliance, as this player receives
this prize without any further ﬁghting. In this extremely asymmetric contest
between the alliance and ,t h ep l a y e r s and  do not have an incentive to
expend positive eﬀort in stage 1, and this explains the outcome in the third line
of Figure 1.
In what follows we will sometimes focus on the lottery contest, sometimes
on the all-pay auction without noise.
3 Complementarities in ﬁghting power
A ﬁrst modiﬁcation from the baseline model is discussed by Skaperdas (1998).
He points out that alliance members’ eﬀort choices need not be perfect substi-
tutes, and that the impact of eﬀorts  and  m a ys i m p l yb em u c hh i g h e r
than the sum of these eﬀorts. The reasons behind this can be manifold. The
alliance may make the sum of their eﬀorts more powerful due to ways to use the
eﬀorts that are unavailable in the absence of an alliance. Or the two eﬀorts of
alliance members may be complementary to each other, such that one player’s
eﬀort  makes the eﬀort of player  more valuable.
6Note that diﬀerent tie-breaking rules are applied in the inter-alliance contest and in the
intra-alliance contest in this case, in order to avoid an openness problem for the equilibrium
in the inter-alliance conﬂict.
7This equilibrium outcome is well known from work by Hillman and Riley (1989), and
Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996).
6Note that this eﬀect needs to be considerable if the contest between former
alliance members dissipates a large share of the prize. In particular, if this
contest is described by a symmetric all-pay auction without noise, the incentive
for players  and  to contribute a positive eﬀort in stage 1 is zero, regardless
of how strong the synergies between ’s and  ’s eﬀorts are.
4 Tight budget caps
An alliance between players  and  can be attractive from their perspective if
players have tight budget limits, even if the contest success functions are those
of an all-pay auction without noise. This case has been analyzed by Konrad
and Kovenock (2009). To illustrate their point, consider the baseline framework,
assuming that the contest success functions  and  are all-pay auctions without
noise, as in the third line in Figure 1. Let the prize be normalized to 1, and
assume that players face budget constraints, with  ∈ [0 ] for  ∈ {},
and  ∈ [0 ],f o r ∈ {}.8 They show that










is a suﬃcient condition for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in
which  and  beneﬁt from forming an alliance. Their payoﬀs increase from
zero in a contest among three stand-alone players to 1− −2.A tt h es a m e
time, the formation of the alliance reduces the payoﬀ of player  to zero. To
illustrate, consider, for instance,  =  =0 1,a n d =0 15.I n t h i s
example, should  win in stage 1, this player takes home the full prize  =1 .
This determines ’s valuation of winning in stage 1. If the alliance wins, they
have to ﬁght about the prize. As both have the same budget, and as this budget
is very small, they both expend the whole budget in stage 2,i . e . , =  =0 1,
and each of them wins with probability 1/2. As a result, each of them attributes
a value to the outcome in which the alliance wins that is equal to 1
2 − =0 4.
Both the continuation value for  and the continuation values for  and  are
higher than the respective budgets of the players. Accordingly, the players 
and  are also budget constrained in stage 1.
In the absence of an alliance, the fact that  =0 15  01= implies
that player  can always outcompete both stand-alone players  and .A n d
while  =  +  is not the equilibrium outcome, it determines ’s payoﬀ in
the equilibrium in absence of an alliance, as 1 −  =0 9. And the equilibrium
payoﬀso fp l a y e r s and  are zero in this case.
If  and  form an alliance, they can jointly outcompete , as their joint
resources exceed the joint resources of player . This potentially shifts the
rent from player  to the players  and , should they manage to make clever
joint bids. Konrad and Kovenock (2009) show that they can use a stochastic
coordination mechanism (only observable to them) that makes their joint contri-
butions follow the equilibrium bidding strategies of a single player with budget
2 who plays against .
8Note that this assumes that players face the same budget constraint in the inter-alliance
contest as in the intra-alliance contest, and that their eﬀort choices in the inter-alliance contest
do not aﬀect their budgets in the intra-alliance contest. Of course, many variations of these
assumptions that are also plausible are possible, and can lead to diﬀerent results.
7Note that, for this mechanism to work, it is important that the budgets of 
and  that are available for ﬁghting internally against each other, do not depend
on the players’ eﬀort choices in the ﬁght between player  and the alliance of
 and .
5 Overcoming free-riding by a threat of internal
conﬂict
In the framework by Esteban and Sákovics (2003), the free-rider problem and
the hold-up problem inside an alliance add or even compound. There is hope,
however, that the two problems interact in a more constructive way. Konrad
and Leininger (2011) analyzed an inter-alliance conﬂict in which the hold-up
problem of possible internal ﬁghting can be used to incentivize the members of
an alliance and thereby overcome the free-rider problem of making contributions
to the total ﬁghting eﬀort of the alliance.
Am o d i ﬁed and simpliﬁed version of their mechanism can be described as
follows. In the center of the structure they consider is an alliance. This group
consists of  players, numbered by 1, and for simplicity — unlike Konrad
and Leininger (2011) — let us consider a symmetric set of players. The players
contribute eﬀorts  to the total alliance eﬀort  that is the sum of these
contributions. The group ﬁghts against an outside enemy that may consist of a
group or a stand-alone player, and the group wins this ﬁght with a probability
(),w h e r e is the aggregate eﬀort generated by the enemy, and  is a
contest success function, as in the baseline model. For the sake of simplicity
and in order to stay close to the baseline model, assume that the enemy is a
stand-alone player. If the alliance loses, the prize goes to the enemy and the
game is over. If the alliance wins, then they have to ﬁnd a solution for the
division of this gain among themselves.
As i m p l i ﬁed version of the subgame considered by Konrad and Leininger
(2011) that follows if the alliance was victorious and that yields similar over-
all results as in their framework is a Nash division game.9 This subgame is
described as follows: each of the  former members of the victorious alliance
chooses a share  ≥ 0.I f a l l s h a r e s  s u mu pt oa na m o u n tt h a ti sl e s so r
equal to 1, then each player receives his share in the prize, and what is not
claimed by the players is costlessly disposed. If, however, the sum of shares
claimed exceeds 1, then the whole prize is lost for the members of the alliance.
The Nash division subgame has multiple equilibria. Any set of   1 that sum
up to 1 also constitutes an equilibrium of this subgame, and in each of these
equilibria the full prize is peacefully allocated to members of the alliance. Let us
denote a representative of this class of equilibria as α∗ =( ∗
1∗
).H o w e v e r ,
a whole further set of equilibria exists which has the property that Σ6=  1
for all  =1 .10 One element of this set is α0 =( 1 11).11 All players
9This simpliﬁcation has been suggested to me by James Fearon.
10If this condition is fulﬁlled for player , the player knows that the full prize is waisted
in any case, regardless of his own choice . Accordingly, the player can make a claim that
is suﬃciently high to support this equilibrium and to make this condition fulﬁlled for other
players.
11To be precise, for  =2 , there is only one ineﬃcient equilibrium, 0 =( 1 1) but a
8who have been members of the alliance receive a zero payoﬀ in any of these
equilibria for which Σ6=  1 in the distribution subgame.
The multiplicity of equilibria can now be used to implement alliance mem-
bers’ eﬀort choices in the inter-alliance ﬁght as follows. Suppose the combination
of contributions to be implemented is x∗ =( ∗
1∗
). Suppose further that
players have the following beliefs about the equilibrium that is played in case
the alliance wins the prize: they believe that one speciﬁc α∗ =( ∗
1∗
) is
chosen if all player behave according to x∗,a n dα0 is selected if at least one of
the alliance players deviates from x∗. In this case, for a given aggregate eﬀort
choice  ∗ of the enemy, (x∗α∗) can be the outcome of selﬁsh, individually





 ≥ 0 for all  =1 .( 2 )
The left-hand side in (2) is the expected equilibrium payoﬀ of player  if player 
makes an eﬀort choice in accordance with x∗ and this is followed by the peaceful
sharing outcome in case the alliance is victorious.
Konrad and Leininger (2011) consider a distribution game inside the alliance
that has considerably more structure and is closer to the structure of the baseline
model. In their framework, one of the alliance members receives the whole
winner prize and makes (unconditional) payments or gifts to the members of
his group. And the members of the group are either satisﬁed both with their
own and other members’ contributions to the alliance eﬀort, and with what
they received from the prize, or they are displeased with one or several of these
items. As a result of their satisfaction with these choices they either choose
a non-cooperative interaction that is peaceful, or they choose to ﬁght between
them, in which case a large share of the winner prize is dissipated. This more
complex structure serves a very similar purpose as a Nash division game does.
6 The role of information
An alliance may provide beneﬁts to its members that are not accounted for in
the baseline model or by the variants analyzed so far. As has been discussed
by Bearce, Flanagan and Floros (2006), alliances may serve the purpose of
information exchange. They consider some military alliances, including the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and argue that such alliances may
facilitate the ﬂow of information between its members. Such an information
ﬂow may be beneﬁcial for its members, may facilitate coordination and may
help increasing the eﬃciency of use of their ﬁghting resources. One of many of
such aspects is addressed in a paper by Konrad (2011).
This paper considers  players and starts with assuming that these players
may be partitioned arbitrarily into subsets 1,..., of alliances that consist of
one or several players. Each player chooses his or her eﬀort  ∈ [0 ],w h e r e
 is the player’s budget limit, which is assumed to be small in comparison to
the size of the prize that is again normalized to 1. A contest success function
allocates the prize to one of the  players as a probabilistic function of all players’
eﬀort choices 1,...,,w h e r e(1) denotes the win probability for player
continuum of eﬃcient equilibria. For 2 the set of ineﬃcient equilibria is a continuum as
well.
9. This latter assumption removes one of the most salient features of alliances
from the picture on purpose: eﬀorts of alliance members do not add or compound
in this framework, and it is not the alliance that wins the prize, but the prize
is appropriated directly by one of the players in the set of players, even if this
player is a member of an alliance that consists of several players. In this way a
possible hold-up problem from intra-alliance ﬁghts and the free-rider problem of
making contributions to total alliance eﬀo r tt h a tb e n e ﬁts also the other members
of the alliance are both removed from the picture. The framework also does not
allow for eﬀects of supermodularity of alliance members’ contributions (as in
Skaperdas 1998), nor for the possibility that players can overcome budget limits
by way of forming an alliance (as in Konrad and Kovenock 2009). Instead, the
framework focuses on a speciﬁc aspect of information exchange: it assumes that
players’ budget limits  are their private information. These limits are random
draws from a commonly known distribution () with support [0],b u tt h e
actual realizations of these random choices are observed only by the player itself,
and by all co-players who are in the same alliance as this player.
Konrad (2011) analyses ﬁrst the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the case in
which all alliances consist of single players ( = ) and derives a condition for
() which makes sure that it is a dominant strategy for each player to simply
expend his whole budget in the ﬁght of all-against-all. It limits consideration to
contests with  being the all-pay auction without noise. Intuitively, expending
the whole military capacity available to a player is a worthwhile strategy if the
likely distribution of budgets of all other players is such that the player would
even like to expend more than he has, even if he anticipates that all other players
will expend their full budgets. For instance, if the contest success function is
the all-pay auction without noise, then a suﬃcient condition for  =  to
constitute an equilibrium is shown in Konrad (2011) to be
( − 1)(())−20() ≥ 1 for all  ∈ (0).( 3 )
The condition (3) states that, for any level , the marginal increase in win-
probability from expending one additional marginal unit more eﬀort (left-hand
side of (3)) is at least as high as the marginal cost of this additional unit of
eﬀort (right-hand side of (3)).
These expenditures  =  are worthwhile for player  under this condition
only in the absence of information about the actual resources expended by other
players. If a player  has a small budget and knows that one or several other
players can and will expend more eﬀort, the player  may want to withdraw.
This is particularly true if the contest success function is highly discriminatory,
like, for instance, for the all-pay auction without noise. Two players  and
 would generally beneﬁt if they could truthfully exchange information about
their budget limits  and .I f  is the contest success function of the all-
pay auction, the player with the higher budget may then still want to continue
to expend very much, given that there are other players who are expected to
expend their whole budget. But the player  who learns that his budget falls
short of the budget of  may withdraw from the competition and save his own
resources, instead of burning them in a competition that is impossible to win.
The information exchange is then beneﬁcial for both players in expectation.
This mutual beneﬁt of information explains why players beneﬁtf r o mf o r m i n g
alliances in this framework, even if the only implication of being in an alliance
10with another player is the exchange of information about their budget limits.
Based on this principle, the formation of such information alliances is always
beneﬁcial for the members of such an alliance, and the merger of two alliances to
an even larger alliance is also beneﬁcial. This suggests that, with other aspects
being absent, a process of alliance formation comes to an end in this framework
only if the smallest number of alliances that is possible has been reached, i.e.,
if a further merger between existing alliances is no longer feasible.
7 Multiple fronts and resource transfers
A further important reason for why the formation of an alliance can be advan-
tageous has been illustrated by Kovenock and Roberson (2011). Their analysis
is in the context of Colonel Blotto games and departs from the baseline model
along several dimensions: First, players have exogenously given amounts of mil-
itary resources. These resources are used up in the military contest, because
they have no use other than in the military competition. Second, players ﬁght
against each other at several fronts simultaneously, with a competition for one
prize at each front. Their main concern is therefore not about the choice of the
total quantity of eﬀort, but about how to use the given capacity of eﬀort along
diﬀerent fronts. They consider alliances which allow players to transfer military
resources between them inside the alliance.
A main result of their analysis is that alliances may increase alliance mem-
bers’ payoﬀs, compared to a situation in which they stand alone. Even the player
who transfers military resources to anoth e rp l a y e ra n di sl e f tw i t hal o w e rs t o c k
of military resources himself may gain from the transfer.
To give a simpliﬁed example of the type of situation that has a similar ﬂavor,
consider a military conﬂict between three players that may be considered as
countries ,  and . Let country  have common frontiers with countries
 and , as in Figure 2, and let  ﬁght two wars simultaneously, one at its
common frontier with country , another at the common frontier with country
. By assumption, in each of the two conﬂicts a prize of size 1 is at stake which
is appropriated by the winner of the respective conﬂict. Consider next the
respective conﬂicts and the rules that apply more speciﬁcally. Each country has
a given endowment of military resources, denoted as ,  and .R e c a l l
that the military resources have no value or use other than in the military
conﬂict. Let  ≥ 0 denote the military resources used by country  in the
direct conﬂict with country .B yd e ﬁnition,  =  =0 , as these countries
have no common frontier. Let country ’s probability of winning the respective
conﬂict at its frontiers with  and  be deﬁn e db yt h el o t t e r yc o n t e s t ;i . e . ,
( )=(+),i f+  0, and equal to 1/2 otherwise.
Of course, the respective win probabilities for  and for  are  =1− 
and  =1− .12
In the absence of an alliance between  and  we require that  ∈ [0 ],
 ∈ [0 ],a n d+ ∈ [0 ]. Consider now the equilibrium choices
of eﬀorts. As  and  are increasing in  and , we can safely assume
12Here the example departs from Kovenock and Roberson (2008), as they consider a
Colonell-Blotto game in which the conﬂict at each front is determined by the rules of an
all-pay auction without noise. Also, they consider a framework with many players and battle
fronts, allowing for much richer combinations of resource transfers.
11Figure 2: Two-front war with very unequal alliance partners: the initial distri-
bution of military capacity.
that  =  and  = .M o r e o v e r ,+ =  in the equilibrium
will also hold, given that military eﬀort within the given capacity limits has no
opportunity cost. The problem therefore reduces to the optimal division of 
between the two fronts. The (interior) solution for an optimum requires that





( + )2 =





Consider now a possible alliance between  and , and assume that the
alliance allows them to reallocate military capacity between them, prior to the
two actual conﬂicts. For instance, in Figure 2, assume that country  may con-
sider to ship a number of tanks from country  to country , hence, enhancing
the military capacity in  from  to  + , and reducing the military ca-
pacity in country  from  to  − .A si tﬁts with the non-cooperative
framework we consider, let this be an unconditional transfer of resources; let us
rule out any transfers or side payments between the two countries in particular,
both prior to, and past to the actual conﬂicts. We ask whether such a resource
transfer can be desirable from the perspective of country . The answer is less
obvious than it may seem. The resource transfer reduces the ﬁghting power
of . Considered in isolation, this is bad for country .I f c o u n t r y  were
to divide its military capacity between the two fronts in the same way as in
the absence of the transfer, country  would simply reduce its win probabil-
ity. However, the transfer makes country  a stronger military power. This is
observed by country ,a n dc o u n t r y may react to this fact and shift more
of its overall military capacity from the front with country  to the front with
country . This relocation of military resources by country  is advantageous
for player . Whether or not an unconditional resource transfer from  to 
can improve ’s payoﬀ then depends on whether the eﬀect of directly weakening
own military power is stronger or weaker than the strategic eﬀect that is caused
by the relocation of military resources away from the front between  and .
T h ea n s w e ra b o u tt h er e l a t i v es i z eo ft h ed i r e c te ﬀect and the strategic eﬀect
generally depends on the type of contest success functions that apply for the two
12A m   B m   C m   CB x  CA x   B    A   
1 11  10  5.9  4.1  0.65076 0.19621 
2 10  10  5.2  4.8  0.65782 0.29419 
Figure 3: Payoﬀs in the numerical example on two-front war.
fronts, and on the military endowments which are at the command of the three
countries. A simple example can illustrate, however, that the strategic eﬀect
can be stronger than the direct eﬀect of weakening own military power. Figure
3c o n s i d e r sas p e c i ﬁc numerical example. The ﬁrst row considers a given initial
distribution of military capacities, the division of  between the two fronts as
an optimal reply by  for this given distribution, and the resulting payoﬀsf o r
and . The second line considers a reallocation of military capacity between 
and , the optimal division of  as a reply to this changed allocation, and the
resulting payoﬀs. Note that the payoﬀs of both countries  and  are increased
due to the shift of one unit of military capacity from country  to country .
This shows that such a transfer can be self-enforcing in a fully non-cooperative
framework.
One of the properties of this example is that the transfer is made from
a comparatively well-endowed country to a country with very little military
resources. Intuitively, the alliance allows the countries to reallocate their ﬁghting
capacity to where it generates higher gains. This, in isolation, increases the sum
of their payoﬀs. Moreover, reallocation of one unit has a very large marginal
impact on the military threat that  encounters at the border with country .
This is why  relocates a considerable amount of resources away from the border
with  and to the border with , and this makes such a transfer beneﬁcial for
country .
8 In-group favoritism and out-group spite
Much of the historical evidence on the possible break-up of victorious alliances
is seemingly in line with the ideas about the hold-up problem of military and
other alliances. Research in psychology, however, pointed at some implications
of the formation of an alliance and the existence of an enemy that are not
captured in the baseline model. There is considerable evidence that members
of a group develop what is called in-group favoritism: members of a group such
as an alliance tend to choose actions that beneﬁt the whole group, even if these
actions are seemingly not based on narrowly deﬁned selﬁsh material interest
(Brewer 1979). They also showed that what is needed in terms of institutional
setup, joint history etc. to generate such in-group behavior is extremely little
(Tajfel and Turner 1979). This is referred to as the minimal group paradigm.
And there is also evidence that in-group favoritism becomes stronger if there is
ac o n ﬂict between this group and another group, referred to as the out-group
(e.g., Sherif et al. 1961).
Konrad and Morath (2011) take this observation as the starting point to
13consider whether in-group altruism and spiteful behavior vis-a-vis the out-group
and its members can be rationalized on the basis of evolutionary arguments.
They consider a framework in which two symmetric groups,  and  interact
in a static game. Each group consists of  members. The two groups ﬁght in
a standard Tullock (1980) contest for a prize that is allocated to the members
of the winning group and yields a value of 1 to each member of the winning
group.13 Each individual  provides some non-negative eﬀort  to the total
eﬀort of the own group. Let  denote the sum of eﬀorts of members of group
 ∈ {},a n d− the sum of eﬀorts in the respective other group. Then





− ,( 5 )
if  +   0,a n de q u a lt o12 if  +  =0 .I n ( 5 ) , x
− is the
vector of eﬀort choices of all players other than player , assuming that all of
them choose the eﬀort that is equal to the evolutionarily stable strategy. This
problem constitutes the “state game” of an evolutionary game in which each
single generation of players interacts in one such state game, but where there is
a series of non-overlapping generations and a series of such state games.
Searching for evolutionarily stable strategies in this context, ﬁr s tas e to f
possible types of players has to be deﬁned. We may deﬁne this type space as
the interval [0∞),w h e r eap l a y e ro ft y p e is a player who chooses eﬀort  ≡ .
Applying Schaﬀer’s (1988) concept of evolutionary stability, a population that
consists of players of type ∗ is a monomorphic equilibrium in evolutionarily







− =( ∗∗) being the vector of the eﬀorts ∗ chosen by all 2−1 other
players. This notion of evolutionary stability compares the monetary payoﬀ of a
p l a y e rw h oh a sap o s s i b l yd i ﬀerent type  and who interacts with 2−1 players
who all are of the same, equilibrium type ∗, with the expected monetary payoﬀ
of each of these 2−1 players if they interact with 2−2 players of type ∗ and
one player of type .A s t r a t e g y ∗ is evolutionarily stable according to this
condition, if there is no other (mutant) strategy that, if used by a single player
in an otherwise homogenous population of type ∗, yields a higher payoﬀ to this
mutant strategy than to the average non-mutant player.
The Schaﬀer (1988) deﬁnition of evolutionary stability in ﬁnite populations
as in (6) has an interesting feature: A player who adopts a mutant strategy
can do well in this population not only if this mutant strategy yields a higher
payoﬀ to this player, but also if this mutant strategy yields a lower average
payoﬀ to the other, non-mutant players. A player can therefore improve his
evolutionary ﬁtness by adopting actions that harm others, even if these actions
do not beneﬁt the player directly, and a player harms himself if he adopts
actions that beneﬁt others, even if these actions do not harm the player directly
(in terms of monetary payoﬀ). Applied to the inter-alliance conﬂict, this feature
13Their framework therefore includes cases in which the prize is a public good for the
m e m b e r so ft h eg r o u pa sw e l la st h ec a s e si nw h i c ht h ep r i z ei sap r i v a t eg o o da n dt h e yh a v e
to ﬁght internally about its distribution.
14has interesting implications. Consider a player  who contributes more eﬀort to
his own alliance. Apart from the direct implications for the player’s monetary
payoﬀ,t h i sa ﬀects both the payoﬀs of other group members, and the payoﬀs
of members of the out-group. Higher eﬀort by  beneﬁts the members of the
in-group, as this higher eﬀort by  increases the win probability for the players
in ’s alliance. Also, higher eﬀort by  reduces the win probability for the rival
alliance; hence, it harms the members of the out-group.
As shown in Konrad and Morath (2011), the evolutionarily stable strategies
involve higher eﬀort than the eﬀort emerging in a Nash equilibrium with payoﬀ
functions as in (5). Intuitively, let us start at a situation that is an interior
Nash equilibrium for players who maximize their material payoﬀs (5). Consider
player  who thinks about increasing his eﬀort just above the equilibrium eﬀort
level. This increase has a zero ﬁrst-order eﬀect for the player’s own material
payoﬀ — due to the fact that this increase happens at Nash equilibrium levels.
However, the increase has two other ﬁrst-order eﬀects. The additional eﬀort
beneﬁts co-players from the same group as , and it harms players from the
rival group, as it makes the own group more likely to win, and reduces the win
probability of the other group. From an evolutionary point of view, the ﬁrst
eﬀect is a disadvantage for , the second eﬀect is an advantage for . Overall,
starting from a Nash equilibrium, the beneﬁcial eﬀect for  from an increase in
own eﬀort dominates.
They also consider the evolutionarily stable preferences that can implement
these higher eﬀorts as mutually optimal replies to each other for individuals
who maximize these preferences by their choices of eﬀort. They ﬁnd that a
combination of in-group altruism and spiteful preferences vis-a-vis members of
the out-group is suitable for inducing such eﬀort choices as Nash equilibrium
c h o i c e s . A n da ni n t e r p r e t a t i o no ft h e s eﬁndings is in line with the in-group
favoritism found by psychologists.
9C o n c l u s i o n s
Alliances are very common, despite possible free-riding inside the alliance and a
possible hold-up problem that is due to ﬁghting and rivalry inside the alliance.
This suggests that there are beneﬁts of alliance formation that counterbalance
these strategic disadvantages, or reasons why these strategic disadvantages do
not have strong eﬀects. This paper highlights some of the reasons that have
been put forward why the strategic disadvantages may be less strong than in a
benchmark model of alliances. The survey also highlighted a number of poten-
tial beneﬁts of ﬁghting inside an alliance. Among these is the possible synergies
between alliance players’ eﬀorts. What they expend individually may have a
total impact that is higher than the sum of their individual eﬀorts if the alliance
gives them means to use their military capacity in a superior fashion. On the
general level, there are many reasons for why this may be the case. Also, even
if the strategic disadvantage from a possible hold-up problem exists, it need not
dominate the beneﬁts from joint action if players’ budgets are small in compar-
ison to the stakes they are ﬁghting about. One mechanism that overcomes both
problems simultaneously is based on the idea that internal rivalry and ﬁghting
may be triggered by a lack of contributions to the total alliance eﬀort. The
threat of internal conﬂict may then fully eliminate the strategic disadvantages.
15Information exchange inside the alliance has been identiﬁed as another possible
beneﬁt from alliance formation that is absent in the baseline model. The survey
also highlighted one instant in which this may be due to multiple fronts and the
possibility to optimally use a given military capacity inside an alliance. Finally,
the paper touched upon the literature on the role of group spirit, the in-group
favoritism and the negative attitudes for members of other groups, particularly
if the own group competes with these outgroups. In a ﬁght between groups,
in-group favoritism and out-group spite can be based on evolutionary grounds
and may allow players to overcome the free-riding problem and induce them to
make high eﬀort.
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